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STATEMENT: IN DEFENSE OF COUNTERTRADE
Stanislaw J. SOLTYSINSKI *
Although multilateral trade transactions involving cash or credit are more
advanced forms of doing business than barter, it is my view that they will
never replace it. Countertrade. a modern-day mode of barter, plays an im-
portant role in world trade. Despite widespread use, countertrade has been the
subject of dogmatic and idealogically-based criticism that is often based on
faulty economic analyses.
In the early 1970s, the United States and other OECD countries actively
supported long-term countertrade dealings with socialist countries [1]. The
rhetoric of policy-makers in these countries has changed, however, and coun-
tertrade is now attacked as dangerous to world trade [2]. Western authors, for
example, usually depict countertrade as a parasitic phenomenon proliferated
by the socialist countries with the aim of unloading otherwise unsaleable goods
on Western partners. They allege that countertrade undermines the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") system, which condemns reciproc-
ity and bilateralism. Some argue that the world market, which acts as a
regulator of comparative advantage, is distorted by countertrade activity.
Others maintain that countertrade is used to charge free market economy
countries with the inefficiencies and high production costs of state-controlled
economies.
These viewpoints manifest both political and ideological considerations.
Although we cannot discount the present political climate of East-West
relations, I suggest that we separate the trade and political issues for discussion
purposes in order to avoid confusing economic and political considerations.
Opponents of countertrade advance two sets of economic arguments. First.
they contend that countertrade is detrimental to the seller, or to both parties
[3]. Second, they allege harmful "external" ramifications, such as protectionism
and the closing off of part of the free market. It should be noted with reference
to the first set of arguments that trade statistics for the 1970s suggest that the
demand for countertrade has increased not only in East-West trade but also in
North-South and West-West relations [4]. Furthermore, trade experts expect
barter-like practices to increase in every region of the globe [5]. These observa-
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tions suggest that countertrade has become an economic necessity that profits
all parties involved.
Nevertheless, some commentators believe that countertrade is dangerous to
the parties themselves. Philip S. Beckerman concludes that: "in some
instances.., everyone pays and no one benefits" [6]. His hypothetical case,
involving the sale of Indonesian pepper in exchange for goods manufactured in
the U.S., however, is not persuasive. Beckerman states that if the U.S. firm
overestimates the quality of the Indonesian product, or if the demand for the
product in the United States is weak, the firm may suffer a loss. Alternatively.
the firm may negotiate a lower purchase price, arguing that it will have to pay
a "handsome" commission to a middleman, e.g. Philipp Brothers, Inc., to
distribute the goods in the United States. The costs of countertrade are thus
borne by the seller. Therefore, it appears that the risks inherent in countertrade
transactions do not differ from those present in other transnational dealings.
Commentators also argue that countertrade benefits only the exporting
country. Exporting countries engage in countertrade for well-known reasons:
the need to balance chronic trade deficits, currency volatility, high interest
rates, and credit shortages. For many governments countertrade is the only
available means to reduce their external debt and obtain necessary commodi-
ties. Their partners, however, often find that countertrade requirements are
difficult to carry out.
Despite the arguments to the contrary, there are virtually no data confirm-
ing that "switches", "barters", "buybacks" or other forms of countertrade
assume an inherently "parasitic posture" [7]. While it is true that countertrade
allows Eastern countries to export goods that might not otherwise be saleable
on an open international market, and to import Western goods that they
desire, it is also true that countertrade permits Western countries to find
markets for goods that are unsaleable in the West [8]. Rather than viewing
countertrade as being parasitic, a better attitude would be, as stated by a
General Electric executive, that: "We have to think, as a country, that half a
loaf is better than none.'"
It should also be remembered that the percentage of Eastern products which
are difficult to sell in the West is very low. For example, a large proportion
(43%) of the buyback goods imported by the OECD countries from Eastern
Europe consists of energy products for which there is a steady demand in the
West. Another 30% of Western imports from that region consists of inter-
mediate goods, primarily chemicals, which also can be easily sold. Only about
2% of East European imports are consumer goods [9].
The second set of economic arguments against countertrade is based on
allegations that countertrade harms parties other than those directly involved
in the agreement. It is argued that countertrade harms the competitors of the
importing and exporting nations, and constitutes a threat to the GATT system.
The argument that countertrade harms nations whose goods compete with
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those of the importing nations fails to recognize that any contract, not only
countertrade agreements, will close off a portion of the market, thereby
harming competitors. Using Beckerman's example of Indonesian pepper, it is
true that if Indonesia sells its pepper at a drastically reduced price in exchange
for badly needed manufactured goods, her neighbors who also export pepper
will be hurt. However, under these circumstances Indonesia would make the
same decision absent a countertrade agreement. Furthermore, it makes no
difference to neighboring competitors whether the price cut benefits the
countertrader, a middleman, or the final purchaser of the pepper.
It is also argued that countertrade poses a threat to domestic competitors of
the exporting company. Acknowledging that large buyback agreements can
increase competition in an importing country, I cannot accept the proposition
that they are inherently more disruptive or dangerous than any other import.
On the contrary, thanks to the joint efforts of Western legislators and im-
porters, the risks of market disruption and cut-throat competition resulting
from long-term compensation agreements are much lower than in other areas.
First, the legislators have provided Western competitors with a plethora of
special and often highly discriminatory relief measures, some of which are
available even in the absence of proof of injury, e.g. Section 701 of the Trade
Agreements Act. Second, Western countertraders, risking legal sanctions, take
great pains to avoid underpricing or suddenly increasing the volume of
imported goods [10]. These forces serve to greatly reduce competition in the
domestic marketplace from countertraded goods.
Finally, countertrade critics condemn countertrade as a threat to the GATT
system of open and multilateral trade. It is true that the reciprocity require-
ment built into countertrade often encourages bilateralism. It is also clear that
countertrade policies are aimed at protecting local industries. Given the
current global economic situation, however, countertrade is justified as a
necessary, and perhaps the least offensive, method of dealing with huge trade
deficits, which are a major obstacle to expanding transnational commerce.
In the present world of protracted recession, huge trade deficits, cash and
credit shortages, economic sanctions, and trade wars, it is unrealistic to expect
a completely free-trade code of conduct, even from countries that favor
cash/credit transactions. In the midst of our prolonged global recession, even
the richest countries, including the United States and the countries of Western
Europe, have resorted to erecting protectionist barriers. It is estimated that
between 40 and 48% of international trade is conducted under some sort of
nontariff restraints. It is clear, therefore, that countertrading nations are not
alone in practising protectionism.
When viewed against the backdrop of such crude protectionist schemes as
voluntary restraints, quotas, bureaucratic harassment, and lists of prohibited
imports [I1], countertrade is probably the least objectionable method of
reducing trade deficits. This is especially true when one realizes that, unlike the
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above-listed protectionist practices, countertrade facilitates the expansion rather
than the reduction of the overall volume of world trade. Thus, many Western
European businessmen recognize that countertrade constitutes an "interface
tool" or mechanism devised to transfer the economic needs and potentials of
one system (nonmarket economies) to another system (free market economies)
[12].
As noted, the global recession has motivated most countries to adopt
protectionist measures rather than a policy of unfettered free trade. Those who
continue to advocate such free trade appear to be basing their arguments on an
economic model of the world that no longer corresponds to reality. They
correctly observe that the unprecedented growth in world trade during the
years 1948-1978 was facilitated by the GATT country pledges to reduce tariffs
and eliminate other trade barriers. They fail to recognize, however, that the
three decades of trade boom were largely the result of post-war recovery and
stable monetary conditions around the world. These conditions no longer exist.
The world economic order is plagued by recession and monetary instability.
Until these conditions pass, the weaker economies should be permitted to
maintain some degree of protection. This policy would, in fact, be consistent
with GATT, which allows member states to resort to such measures in special
circumstances.
In conclusion, although countertrade arguably involves greater risk than
cash/credit transactions and sometimes serves to freeze bilateral relations,
these disadvantages are outweighed by advantages such as the exchange of
goods otherwise unsaleable by either side, protection of local industry, reduc-
tion of trade deficits, and debt-repayment. Moreover, countertrade appears to
be the least offensive form of home market protection in a world where such
protection is necessary for all countries. The growing skill of special clearing
houses, countertrade subsidiaries, and banks allows for more symbiotic rela-
tionships between buyers and sellers and for improvements in the distribution
of bartered goods. Nevertheless, rigid countertrade policies should be treated
by the countries adopting them as a harsh economic necessity entailing more
risk for their traders than for their partners. Such risks include the effects of
selling goods which have not achieved world quality and the traders' inability
to establish their own marketing channels and goodwill.
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[I] Thus. for instance, the deal between Occidental Petroleum Corp. and the Soviet Union.
under which the U.S. firm has been buying ammonia for sale in the United States from plants that
it helped to finance and construct in the exporting country. had been first approved by the U.S.
government and then challenged under Section 406 of the Trade Act. See S.A. Baker and R.O.
Cunningham, Legal Constraints on Countertrade. 5 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L. (1983). this issue.
[2] See Countertrade Practices in East/West Economic Relations (1979).
[31 See R.M. Gadbaw, The Implications of Countertrade Under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 5 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L. (1983), this issue; P. Beckerman. Statement. 5 J.
Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L. (1983). this issue.
[4] Supra note 2. and R. Beardwood. Back to Barter. I Bus. World, No. 3, Summer 1983. at
6-10.
[5] J. de Miramon, Counterirade: A Moderni:ed Barter Systenm. OECD Observer. January
1982. at 12. 13.
[61 Beckerman, supra note 3. According to J. de Miramon "the return to barter reduces the
urgency of a more rational cost-price structure, a multilateral trade framework and currency
convertibility", supra note 5. at 12, 15.
[71 de Miramon, supra note 5. at 1.
[8] "Countertrade may be the only way in which technology thoroughly exploited in the
West, can still be licensed for a valuable consideration. It may also be the most feasible way for a
licensor to be assured access to its licensee's operation for purposes of quality control." P.
Ehrenhaft. Insuring U.S. Participants' Interests in Countertrade. 5 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L.
(1983). this issue.
191 Source: OECD statistics quoted by J. de Miramon. supra note 5. at 13. While the same
report shows that countertrade accounts for less than 15% of the total East-West trade, other
sources estimate that compensation transactions represented a much higher proportion, namely
25-30% of total world trade at the beginning of the 1980s. See New Restrictions on World Trade.
Business Week. July 19. 1982, at 118.
[10] Thus. for instance, the agreement between Occidental Petroleum and the Soviet F.T.O.
involving the ammonia deal provided that the imports were to be priced no lower than prevailing
market prices. It also provided for importing steady quantities of ammonia in order to avoid
disrupting the U.S. market. Baker & Cunningham. supra note 2. According to A. Romoli. "The
anticipated flood of exports of chemical products to EEC markets has not materialized yet." See
infra note 12.
[111 Heading for a Trade War, Newsweek. Nov. 29, 1982. The list of nontariff barriers also
covers frivolous legal charges for dumping, market disruption, antitrust violations. etc.. as well as
politically motivated sanctions and "safety" standards.
1121 A. Romoli. Statement. 5 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L. (1983). this issue.
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